At closing, people celebrate that the signatures are in place. What is rarely clear at that moment: from the next morning, the company is steered according to a different logic than before.

The entrepreneur who was owner and director for years is now a minority shareholder and statutory director. Two roles with partly conflicting interests. The investor wants control without becoming a director. And a new supervisory board or advisory board has to supervise people who are used to deciding for themselves.

For entrepreneurs and investors, this is the most underestimated risk area of a transaction. Not the valuation and not the warranties, but the question of who decides on what after closing, within which frameworks, and who remains responsible for the whole.

Because those are different questions. Under Dutch law, the board is charged with managing the company (Article 2:239(1) of the Dutch Civil Code): strategy and policy, day-to-day management, risk control, reporting and representation. Decision-making is one part of that. An approval threshold of half a million therefore does not move a management task — it places one type of decision somewhere else, while responsibility for the whole stays where it was.

Three documents, three truths

After a transaction, a company is in practice steered by three sets of agreements that rarely align completely.

The articles of association determine the corporate law reality. Subject to restrictions in the articles, the board is charged with managing the company. Only by or pursuant to the articles can board resolutions be made subject to the approval of another corporate body (Article 2:239(3) of the Dutch Civil Code).

The shareholders' agreement determines the contractual reality: reserved matters, information rights, appointment rights, leaver and exit provisions. These agreements bind the parties that entered into them, but have no effect under corporate law unless they are also anchored in the articles.

The board regulations and the authorisation matrix determine the day-to-day reality: who signs for what, which amount requires which approval, how escalation works. This is an internal division of tasks. It does not limit the board's authority and has no effect towards third parties.

The problem arises when these three diverge. An investor who believes they have a veto, while it is only in the shareholders' agreement. A management team that is formally authorised for decisions it does not actually feel responsible for. In practice, parties only discover what they can really enforce when things go wrong.

Note one point that is often assumed but is not correct: for the Dutch private limited company (BV), there is no statutory provision that automatically reserves decisions with a major impact to the general meeting. Article 2:107a of the Dutch Civil Code, which requires approval for an important change in identity or character, only applies to the public limited company (NV). In a BV, you have to arrange it yourself — or it is not arranged.

A veto right is not a management power

Reserved matters are often designed as if they give the investor control. They give something else: the power to block something. That difference has consequences.

A veto does not prevent the company from becoming bound. The board's power of representation is unlimited and unconditional, unless the law provides otherwise (Article 2:240(3) of the Dutch Civil Code). If a director nevertheless enters into an agreement in breach of an approval requirement, the counterparty is in principle protected. What remains is an internal reproach and possible liability, after the damage has already been done.

In addition, a purely contractual veto is weaker than an approval right in the articles. In the first case, the decision remains valid and there is a breach of the shareholders' agreement. If the requirement is anchored in the articles, it affects the adoption of the decision itself and annulment comes into play (Article 2:15 of the Dutch Civil Code).

And then there is a practical point. In buy-and-build programmes, we see lists with dozens of approval requirements. The result is usually not more grip, but a management team that falls back on the investor for every step. Exactly the behaviour that undermines the investment thesis.

How far does the investor's influence reach?

An investor who wants to give direction can arrange this under corporate law. The articles can provide that the board must follow the instructions of another corporate body (Article 2:239(4) of the Dutch Civil Code). In a BV, since the Flex-BV reform these may also be specific instructions; in an NV they are limited to the general lines of policy.

But that right of instruction has a hard limit: the board follows instructions unless they conflict with the interests of the company and its business. Directors are guided by that corporate interest (Article 2:239(5) of the Dutch Civil Code), and that is not the same as the interest of the largest shareholder.

For investors there is a second, less visible limit. For liability in bankruptcy, anyone who has co-determined the policy as if they were a director is treated as a director (Article 2:248(7) of the Dutch Civil Code). The line between active shareholdership and de facto management is not a formal one, but a factual one. Especially in stressful situations, when involvement naturally increases and documentation naturally decreases, that line can be crossed unnoticed.

Two hats, one chair

The entrepreneur who stays on as director and remains a shareholder is structurally in a position with potentially conflicting interests. Think of an earn-out, a follow-on acquisition that dilutes their own stake, a refinancing or a transaction with an affiliated party.

The law is clear about this: a director does not take part in deliberations and decision-making when they have a direct or indirect personal interest that conflicts with the interest of the company (Article 2:239(6) of the Dutch Civil Code). In practice, this rule is often ignored, until a conflict arises and the decision-making is reviewed afterwards. Internal liability does require serious culpability (Article 2:9 of the Dutch Civil Code), but a director's position depends heavily on whether they visibly acted with care: was the interest reported, did the director step back, was it recorded?

Structure governs authority, not ownership

These points can be arranged: consistency between the articles and the shareholders' agreement, a decision matrix fixed before closing, a conflict-of-interest protocol, clear agreements on escalation and deadlock, and a conscious choice between supervision and advice.

What cannot be captured in documents is the behaviour around them. The entrepreneur who formally no longer has a majority but still behaves as the sole owner. The management team that, after the deal, waits for signals from the investment committee instead of deciding. The investor who says they steer from a distance and at the same time calls every week.

In virtually every case that gets stuck after a transaction, the legal structure is not the only problem. The problem is that structure, leadership and behaviour do not align.

HUMA Advisory works with founders, owner-directors, boards and investors in growth, transition and M&A processes. We combine legal and governance expertise with insight into leadership, behaviour and group dynamics. That is why we look not only at what is in the articles and the shareholders' agreement, but also at what actually happens in the boardroom.

Is your organisation facing an investment, an acquisition or a next growth phase? Book an introduction and discover what it takes to keep making decisions quickly and effectively after closing.

This article is general in nature and is not intended as legal advice in a specific case. It is based on Dutch law.

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GovernanceM&A & integration